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Abstract—We focus on affective architecture issues relating to
the generation of expressive facial behaviour, critique approaches
that treat expressive behaviour as only a mirror of internal state
rather than as also a social signal and discuss the advantages of
combining the two approaches. Using the FAtiMA architecture,
we analyse the requirements for generating expressive behavior
as social signals at both reactive and cognitive levels. We discuss
how facial expressions can be generated in a dynamic fashion.
We propose generic architectural mechanisms to meet these
requirements based on an explicit mind-body loop and Theory
of Mind (ToM) processing. A illustrative scenario is given.
Index Terms—Intelligent agents, Affective computing, Interac-
tive systems, Software architecture, Cognitive informatics.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS paper poses the problem of how to incorporate agenerative account of expressive behaviour into an affec-
tive architecture, focusing on facial expressions. Expressive
behaviour using the body posture, gesture, glance, facial
expression is an significant component of communicative
content alongside the verbal channel, and is therefore required
for social agents, whether robots or graphical characters. Facial
expressions are considered particularly important for agents
that have a face (some robots do not), since this is often the
focus of glance by an interaction partner. With more than forty
muscle groups [1], the face has a wide range of movements
and thus substantial expressivity. It has been argued that more
than half of expressive behaviour relates to facial expressions
[2].
In this paper we focus on facial expressions that relate to
affect. Many computational accounts, when not using script-
ing, treat them as a mirror of the internal affective state of
the agent and as a way of signalling that state to interaction
partners [3]. This makes for an architectural mechanism that is
conceptually straightforward: directly connecting the affective
outputs of the architecture to the expressive modalities of the
agent. However it is clear that even children aged 3-4 [4],
never mind adults, routinely modify their facial expressions in
a number of ways related to their social context.
There is an argument for emotional transparency in a social
agent. Cognitive appraisal theory suggests that emotions are
generated when an event is appraised against a person’s goals,
with positive affect when events favour goals and negative
affect when they do not. A transparent display may make a
social agent’s goals, and how far these are successfully met,
more obvious to its interaction partner. Thus the early system
Kismet [5] played the role of an infant in learning scenarios,
and used transparent expressive behaviour to regulate the in-
teraction, to encourage more or reduce the amount of stimulus
it was receiving.
However many applications of embodied social agents
require more sophisticated expressive behaviour. The Laura
agent of [6] deliberately generated warm facial expressions so
as to build trust and rapport. Where an embodied social agent
aims to improve user motivation, or it operates in a training or
education setting [7] then expressive behaviour is more likely
to be an action explicitly chosen by the agent than a reflection
of its internal state. Issues relating to long-lived interaction
and getting past the novelty effect [8] also require a less naive
account of expressive behaviour. Dealing with these issues is
a motivation for this work.
A simple case is where a facial expression related to internal
affect is muffled or suppressed. A classic example would
be playing the card game poker, though a subordinate being
reprimanded by their boss, or a parent walking with their child
on a dark night, might be expected to suppress expressions of
anger and fear respectively. In the case of poker, there are
game-related social norms; in the other two examples a mix
of social norm and in-situ estimation of the impact of ones
expressive behaviour on others in the shared context.
[9] distinguishes four categories of expression modification
(display rules): the cultural; the personal (depending on per-
sonality or other individual factors); vocational requirements
(as in actors); and the need of the moment. Giving a social
agent this ability to suppress expressions requires a process
tracking the contextual impact of a given expression. Empathy,
in which the observer responds to the affective state of another
is one means of carrying out this tracking. More generally, one
might posit Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities, in which one
takes into account how one is likely to be perceived by another
[10]. At the very least the agent must be able to recognise and
adhere to social norms for a given situation.
In the pedagogical example above, expressive behaviour
may also be generated for a specific communicative objective.
Likewise, economic games used to study negotiation may
deploy expressive behaviour competitively as game moves
[11] or as an aid to reaching cooperative decisions [12]. The
classic case of an unwelcome birthday present may result in
a deliberate facial expression of pleasure in order to convey
gratitude. As cited above, children as young as 3 or 4 perform
this modification. Indeed smiles are notoriously ambiguous
about internal state and very often related to social context
[13]. A recent account [14] gives three types of social smiles:
those rewarding the behaviour of others, as in this example,
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those creating or strengthening affiliative social bonds, and
those regulating social hierarchies. We should note that em-
bodied social agents without specific expressive behaviour may
still have their behaviour treated as socially expressive. [3]
examples a robot that turned away from a user immediately
following a request and was interpreted as showing dislike or
contempt. Thus an embodied social agent that can predict the
social impact of its expressive behaviour may help to prevent
misunderstandings. We propose to do this through an explicit
mind-body loop and the application of ToM capabilities.
The key point is that facial expressions operate as social
signals not merely as information about internal state. Even
the greater emotional transparency of infants relates to a social
context where carers are motivated by smiles and will act to
deal with the causes of negative affective states. We argue
that coupling the affective outputs of an agents architecture to
its expressive modalities is insufficient in the development of
embodied social agents.
By modelling the ability to handle expressive behaviour
as a social signal, we broaden the range of applications to
which a social agent can be applied and offer a standard
mechanism for regulating expressive behaviour - whether by
suppression or substitution - rather than ad hoc application-
dependent solutions. We also broaden its communicative reper-
toire by explicitly including expressive behaviour in the set
of actions from which it can select rather than binding it to
the internal affective state being modelled. We seek to retain
some of the interactional advantages of transparent expressive
behaviour by supporting modification and not just overlaying
of expressions, allowing micro-expressions [15] that we refer
to elsewhere as the Partial Poker Face [16].
However, should one equip social agents with what could
amount to deceptive behaviour? There are ethical considera-
tions in creating convincing liars even though we know that
many humans behave like that [17]. But the line between
actually lying and what we describe as social facilitation is
very blurred. [18] argue that up to 30% of social interactions
of longer than 10 minutes contain deceptions about affective
state. Thus more long-lived social agents do need more so-
phisticated expressive behaviour to create smooth interaction.
A second set of architectural requirements is raised by the
dynamic nature of expressive behaviour. Some representations,
such as the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) [1], define
specific static facial expressions. In reality, facial expressions
are nearly always continuous and dynamically varying, along
with the speech stream they often accompany. State-based
expressive behaviour fits well with a state-based architecture,
with dynamics confined to interpolating between the defined
expressive states. In addition, a state-based approach fits
well with explicit representations of affective state, where a
dynamic approach to expressions is more consistent with a
process-based architecture and implicit representations. We
return to these issues in the next section.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Theoretical issues
While we have argued above against wholly transparent
affective expressive behaviour, the idea that expressive be-
haviour represents affective state in humans at all is far from
uncontested. [19] argues strongly the behavioural ecological
view, that facial expressions are not related to affective state
but are entirely social signals produced by an evolutionary
process. However we do not align with this more radical
viewpoint, being more convinced by arguments against it
in [20] and studies such as [21] which shows widespread
interpretation of facial expressions as indicative of affective
state.
A more categorical position still is to reject the idea
that affective states cause actions at all, not just expressive
behaviour conceived as action. This relates to discussions of
Basic Emotion Theory (BET), that a finite set of emotions
such as anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise and
possibly others, emerge from evolutionary processes related
to survival and operate reflex behaviours. As [22] argues in
relation to his New BET, discussion is bedeviled by using
linguistic labels to mean different things, from processes at
different levels of abstraction (e.g. physiological sensations v
cognitive categories) to different affective states (are all forms
of anger the same?). In this paper we take the perspective of
cognitive appraisal theory, that affective state creates action
tendencies priming actions rather than inevitably producing
them, while we also model lower-level processes that have
the character of reactions, if not reflexes.
A generic issue is how far an affective architecture can be
considered social rather than merely individual. Computational
architectures based on psychological theory tend to import in-
dividualist assumptions. The Big Five personality dimensions
[23] sometimes used for behaviour generation in embodied
social agents focuses on individual patterns of behaviour.
Cognitive appraisal theory [24] is not per se incompatible with
the modelling of social and cultural processes, but its focus
on interaction between external events (stimuli) and individual
goals prioritises the individual. Where the goals are taken as
a given, affect will then represent an established individual
reaction to the social context.
Indeed, [24] does not distinguish between appraisals relating
to an event and to a person, so that socially-determined emo-
tions such as sorry-for (someone) are modelled in exactly the
same way as the fear generated by a threat to one’s survival.
Yet the social context is known to have a substantial effect
on individual appraisal: [25] gives the example of watching a
comedy you enjoy with a close friend who disapproves of it.
Social appraisal [25] [26] involves appraising the thoughts
or feelings of others, especially those with whom there is a
relationship, as well as the emotion-causing event itself. This
view stresses the importance of empathic reactions and the
role of expressive behaviour in social regulation processes
which might result in modifications of expressive behaviour.
Note that social appraisal does not require an actual change in
internal affective state. Sensing the disapproval of a friend - a
social signal - one might actually find a comedy less amusing,
or, for affiliative reasons, suppress the expression of one’s
amusement.
Social appraisal is not unlike the idea of coping behaviour
[27]. Coping behaviour, a reaction to an affective state, has
an external path in which actions-in-the-world are carried
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out to make the world more compatible with the goals of
the individual. It also has an internal path, where cognitive
strategies adjust a painful affective state, for example by
perceiving a ’silver lining’ to an unpleasant event. Internal
coping behaviours are a second possible source of expressive
behaviour modification.
Cognitive appraisal architectures can be extended into a
more socially responsive form by adding explicit mechanisms
to handle social interaction. Thus the FAtiMA architecture
[28] has been extended with a simulation ToM capability
[29] (see section 4), and the ability to model culturally-
specific behaviour [30]. Both offer mechanisms supporting the
modification of expressive behaviour.
The developmental robotics approach [31] is more likely
to give the social context priority since it considers the
construction of internal architectural structures by interactional
processes such as enaction [32]. However since this work is
driven by the analysis of very young infants, most of that
looking at communication considers basic capabilities like
mutual glance and the development of turn-taking. For facial
expressions [33] the issue of interest is how to learn a mapping
between expressions and internal state. This does not bear on
the problem considered here.
A further theoretical dimension is a static versus a dynamic
account of behaviour, with implications for the approach a
computational implementation must take. In its early form,
cognitive appraisal was distinctly state-based: an event was
compared with the goals of the individual, a set (usually) of
labelled emotions was generated to enable action tendencies.
More modern versions of cognitive appraisal, such as the
Component Process Model (CPM) [34], break appraisal into a
sequence of related actions in a pipeline of evaluation phases,
each with a set of subchecks that may be shared between
phases. The main phases of the CPM concern Relevance,
Implication, Coping Potential, Normal Significance where the
last of these refers to social norms. Linking these to Facial
Action Units, as CPM does in some cases, allows facial
expressions to be generated directly from the appraisal process
[35] without having to pass through labelled emotions, thus
producing a more dynamic model.
A multi-stage model reduces the granularity of each step,
moving in the direction of process. In addition, because facial
expressions can be driven at different stages on different
timescales, it supports micro-expressions and expression mod-
ification. However multi-stage appraisal is not the only way
of dealing with this issue. A different class of models, those
based on drives and homeostasis, are more directly process-
based [36]. The PSI model [37] works with drives based
on five basic needs: personal survival (food etc); species
survival (sex etc); affiliation (belonging to a group, engaging
in social interactions); certainty (the need for predictability of
events and consequences) and competence (the need to master
problems and tasks, including meeting needs). Drive-based
architectures work with upper and lower bounds on needs,
setting a comfort zone within which the values are acceptable.
If a need moves out of the comfort zone, the drive seeks to
activate behaviours to move it back - this is the process of
homeostasis which is inherently dynamic.
The PSI model has no direct representation of emotion, but
the behaviours generated by the drives are interpretable as hav-
ing affective qualities such as anger, joy or anxiety. It outputs
numerical values of valence and arousal which can be used to
synthesise multiple expressive behaviours without having to
pass through labelled emotions or necessarily through facial
action units [38]. The downside of a model at this lower level
of abstraction is that it is difficult to use for embodied social
agents using natural language, since language by definition
works at the symbolic level. This suggests a multi-level
model, very common in robotics, in which moment-to-moment
behaviour is controlled by drives but strategic decisions are
made via appraisal and planning. This is the approach taken
in the FAtiMA architecture discussed below. A multi-level
model is also a multi-stage model, with lower layers typically
working on shorter timescales, thus also supporting micro-
expressions and expression modification.
B. Implementations
In this section we consider implemented systems that deal
with expression modification and also with facial expressions
generated as explicit communications.
One body of work on expression modification is concerned
with combining more than one emotion to produce mixed
facial expressions, for example an immediately generated
emotion with longer term affective states like mood [39]. This
is however still a version of transparency. [40] discusses the
issue of social modification of expressions but focuses on
the actual composition process. [41] takes this idea further
by considering how different emotions might arise from an
egocentric appraisal and an empathic appraisal and evaluating
the impact on users of masking (empathic expression overrides
egocentric expression) and superimposition (expressions are
combined). However expressions were hand-coded rather than
generated autonomously by an architecture and the focus was
on realising and then evaluating the expressions in a graphical
character.
Empathic behaviour requires facial modification within a
social context. It is a significant issue in work on pedagogical
agents, though some work [42] [43] relates to natural language
expressions rather than non-verbal behaviour. [7] discusses
robot expressive behaviour in a tutoring context, but the robot
used had no facial expressivity and relied on gesture, while
affective responses were derived from an application-specific
learner model that would not generalise to other domains.
[44], in a role-play therapeutic domain, argues expressive
behaviour may relate to affect generated by an agent’s own
coping actions, citing guilt as a result of a shift-blame action.
This produces a sequence of expressive behaviours but still re-
lates to the actual affective states of the agent. This application
couples a cognitive architecture similar to the one we modify
to a pre-authored dialogue model; as it involves agent-agent
rather than human-agent dialogue, it can be certain about the
affective states each agent is responding to. Thus it combines
a cognitive architecture able to model a rich internal state with
the focus on interactivity of a dialogue system, albeit a pre-
authored one.
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Interesting work on affect in interaction has been carried
out in the context of negotiation games. [11] [45] studies the
social impact of an agent’s display of joy, sadness, anger and
guilt, and how they function as social signals. These studies
support learning of the parameters for a Bayesian network
giving probabilistic predictions, from emotion displays, of how
the negotiating partner appraises the interaction. This supports
predictions about their intentions [46]. This is not intended to
be and is not a generic architecture but is specific to the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma used in the studies.
Other work on expressive behaviour as social signal focuses
on deception and lies. [17] investigates how deceptive expres-
sive behaviour may be used to produce a desired outcome in
an economic game, using a similar approach to [45]. Focusing
on a particular element of negotiation, this work demonstrates
that agents with a deceptive facial expression when they make
an offer do attain the desired negotiation outcome. However
the study was carried out with video recordings of agent
expressions rather than with a generating architecture.
[47] directly investigates expressive behaviour for an agent
telling lies, building on [48]. It argues that facial expressions
will not be completely deceptive because some facial muscles
are not controllable at the conscious level. Thus both micro-
expressions and compound facial expressions will occur. This
work also considers timing, with faked expressions lasting
longer than transparent ones and asymmetry, where faked
expressions have more activity on one side of the face than the
other. Two studies were carried out, which both used smiles
to mask other expressions in a similar way to [40]. In the first
study, smiles were either straightforwardly happy or combined
with disgust: these conditions were hand-coded.
A second study used a liar dice game in which lies are
part of game play. As with other work using games, the
context is easy to assess, depending entirely on the game play,
so a generic architecture for deception was not required. In
both cases, the aim was to evaluate the social impact of the
compound expressions.
Work that is very relevant to this paper came from [49]. This
distinguished between an impulsive agent one that directly
expresses its affective state and a reflexive agent, which
could refrain from expressing its state. However it was based
on the annotation of dialogue plans rather than an affective
architecture. These were held in a plan library within the
framework of a BDI architecture [50] originally designed for
rational agents and only later extended, in conceptual form, to
incorporate affect [51].
This view of expressive behaviour as a multi-modal adjunct
to language communication comes from a community with a
different focus from cognitive or affective modelling. It gen-
eralises the idea of a performative language action into non-
verbal behaviour [52]. It has a strong focus on interactivity, but
the social signal aspects of expressive behaviour are inferred
from the dialogue moves with which it is associated. In this
tradition, dialogue is viewed as a means of changing beliefs in
a purely logical model [53], an orthogonal view to cognitive
modelling. It supports affective communication but without a
modelled affective state or any affect-generating process.
Cognitive model-based research puts language actions on a
similar level to other agent actions rather than giving them
control of agent activity, while in dialogue system research,
agent actions are determined by a dialogue manager. This
delegates the control of expressive behaviour to a process that
annotates utterances using a mark-up formalism ([54], [55]).
Mark-up of a dialogue stream both gives primacy to lan-
guage over expressive behaviour, and assumes that the deci-
sions about what to communicate are made by the Dialogue
Manager before affective expressive behaviour is generated.
However a social signal approach requires that affective
choices be made at the level of action selection in the archi-
tecture. We also argue that the modification process requires
an internal circuit within the architecture, since if the agent
does not know what affective response it has chosen, it cannot
modify it in a contextually sensitive manner. In human terms,
you need to know you are angry in order to suppress anger.
This follows the work of [56] and in turn the ideas of [57]
who stresses the somatic aspects of emotion, an emotional
body state, which feeds into later processing at a more
cognitive level. It is also consistent with the more sophisticated
view of cognitive appraisal already mentioned [58] as a multi-
stage process with a temporal profile, consisting of cognitive
appraisal, a physiological activation and involving arousal,
motor expression (expressive behaviour), a motivational com-
ponent, and a state of subjective feeling. If one sees expressive
behaviour as integral to emotion in this way, then even as a
reflection of internal state it poses architectural issues.
Finally, [59] addresses some of the same questions as this
work but focuses on social signal analysis so as to establish
the affective state of an interaction partner rather than social
signal generation. It is concerned with recognising the social
signals associated with emotional regulation - or coping be-
haviour - focusing on shame, generated in a cognitive appraisal
framework as a result of agent actions that have negative
praiseworthiness. It incorporates a simulation model of ToM,
similar to that discussed below in section 4, implementing
a shame model in its own architecture to make predictions
about an interaction partner’s likely social signals, and thus
aid Bayesian recognisers in detecting them. This maintains a
transparency approach. It does enrich its model by including
the target of the expressive behaviour - an issue not yet dealt
with in the work here.
III. REPRESENTATIONAL ISSUES
A. Architectures
All computational architectures are shaped by their repre-
sentational choices. We have already referred to one significant
dimension, the choice between state-based and process-based
representations. In affective architectures, this has tended to
result in a choice between symbolic representations actuated
through inferencing (for example [28], [39] and non-symbolic
representations in which homeostasis is a dominant mecha-
nism (for example [37]).
Dialogue management systems were once symbolic sys-
tems, manipulating natural language. More recently, after
the success of statistical approaches in speech recognition,
machine learning on large corpuses of spoken dialogue in
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specific domains has encoded probabilistic transitions between
dialogue actions [60]. This makes the addition of expressive
behaviour, especially that related to affect, more difficult
as it requires analysis of the chosen dialogue action with
fallible approaches such as sentiment analysis. It produces an
architecture in which the role of inferencing is substituted by
transitions in the learned network, an implicit encoding. Thus
the issue of explicit versus implicit representation is a further
dimension.
The most important representational decision in an affective
architecture is how to represent affect itself, determined in
large part by the chosen theoretical framework. A simple state-
based architecture may represent affect as a single symbolic
variable and an associated intensity value, as in the OCC
model [24] with its 42 named emotions, while a model built
around drives and homeostasis may have no explicit repre-
sentation of affect at all [37] but generate affective behaviour
as dynamic patterns. A multi-stage theory such as the one in
this work may involve multiple representations of affect, in
particular if affect is seen as a phenomenon on more than one
architectural level.
The FAtiMA architecture used as the basis for the ideas
below [28] divides into a reactive and a predictive component
working on different time-scales and controlling different
types of behaviour. Its predictive component runs a planning
system, which is where overt communicative intent would be
handled. But some behaviour cannot reasonably be thought
of as consciously planned - take the example of bursting
into tears at the death of a loved one. FAtiMA incorporates
a reactive layer that triggers much shorter-term unplanned
behaviours. Note that incorporating a reactive system does not
in itself force the choice between a symbolic or non-symbolic
representation since symbolic rules can play this role.
We have seen that cognitive appraisal itself may be decom-
posed into multiple stages suggesting a collection of processes
rather than a single process. There is physiological evidence
[61] of different brain mechanisms being involved in what
is known as emotional or affective empathy (or sometimes
as emotional contagion), and cognitive empathy, based on
reasoning about the affective state of another.
Damasio [57] distinguishes between primary and secondary
emotions. The former are seen as innate, relating to fast and re-
active behaviour patterns such as fight/flight, or infant distress
behaviours, that do not involve cognitive-level processing, and
are closely tied to specific stimuli. Secondary emotions like
admiration or hope are ascribed to higher cognitive processes
involving expectations, learned outcomes and social context.
Note that this distinction does not correspond exactly to the
language labels that we may use: fear may count as a primary
emotion if one is attacked by a ferocious dog, but we may
use the same label in relation to an event that has not yet
happened, an inverse to hope.
Primary emotions independent of the social context, are
good examples of emotions an agent might suppress after a
later evaluation. If a ferocious dog attacked while one was
taking a child for a walk, a flight response activated by
a primary emotion of fear might be suppressed in favour
of an attack on the dog to defend the child. The language
label for this would be courage. However, the anger one
might feel witnessing the action of a bullying boss against
a fellow employee is not primary by this definition, though its
expression or suppression is also subject to evaluation of the
social context.
While the distinction between primary and secondary emo-
tions is not wholly useful for this work, that between somatic
and cognitive impact does capture the stages to be modelled
so that an agent can feel an emotion so as to modify it. The
modelling issue is how to represent affect in cognitive and
somatic systems and how to link these representations both to
evaluation of social context and to the generation of expressive
behaviour.
B. Representations for facial expressions
Accounts of expressive behaviour that reduce it to multi-
modal annotation of the output from an affective architecture
(or indeed, from a dialogue manager [62]) pose the rep-
resentational problem as one of mapping from the architec-
ture (conceived as mind) to the agents actuation capabilities
(conceived as body). Interesting work in graphical characters
has moved towards a standardised mark-up language for this
purpose, Behavioural Markup Language (BML) [63] and to
middleware based on this [64] such as SmartBody. Figure
1 gives an example of BML controlling an agents gaze in
SmartBody [64].
Fig. 1. An example of BML from SmartBody, controlling Glance.
The standard BML flow assumes that behaviour planning
will deal with annotations on utterances from a higher-level
process. It leaves no space for a somatic representation that
can reflect emotion back into the cognitive system to be re-
evaluated. Such a causal chain would run as shown in Figure
2 producing a mind-body-mind loop.
The somatic level both dispatches output to the actual
generation of expressive behaviour and is also evaluated so
that the agent knows what it is feeling and is able to start
the modification process. The somatic level also supports
modelling of involuntary expressive changes - for example
blushing or crying. The temporal overlap produced by re-
evaluation is consistent with the idea of micro-expressions [15]
that facial expressions will reflect internal affective state for
only a very short time before being replaced by the socially
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Fig. 2. Affect re-evaluation
determined expression. This idea is central to our proposed
architecture.
A somatic level also has a role to play in mapping affect
onto an agent’s expressive capabilities. Happiness can be
expressed as a smile if a social agent can smile. If not - for
example a robot with no face, or a face without a moveable
mouth - other modalities can be selected.
Work has taken place to refine the markup system and
to add a specific virtual body representation [65] in the
Thalamus system. This inserted a BodyInterface unit between
the agent mind and behaviour planning in the same way as
the somatic level in Figure 2. It has the ability to both receive
and send messages. This incorporates a feedback mechanism,
needed for the expressive capabilities under discussion, but, as
conceived, deals with external events and not internal affective
events.
The two most widely-used systems for transforming an
affective response into a behaviour specification in embodied
agents are the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) [1] and di-
mensional systems, of which the Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance
System (PADS) [66] is the most popular.
FACS defines 44 muscle groups on the human face and
relates muscles to expressions via facial Action Units (AUs),
specific configurations of these muscle groups. It is often
used by researchers who want to generate facial expressions
in social agents, but is of much wider applicability. It was
designed for facial analysis, for example on videos, and is still
much more widely used for this purpose than for generation.
It is also used for research into expression recognition.
Used generatively, FACS offers a way of defining certain
facial expressions with respect to specific affective states, and
a tool is available for doing this [67]. In particular, AUs
can be used to define Ekman’s (contested) conception of
primitive emotions [68] facial expressions corresponding to
fear, anger, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise that are said
to be recognised across cultures (though this has been recently
challenged; see [69]). However, if these primitive emotions are
seen as comparable to the primary emotions discussed above,
then they are targets for modification, and indeed they are
rarely visible in everyday adult social interaction. They thus
form a basis for blending, as in [47] discussed above.
An AU-defined facial expression representing an affective
state is straightforward to interface to an affective architecture
outputting such states. However, this is also a disadvantage,
since it produces a static and rigid mapping. The very concept
of an expression, as against a behaviour, works poorly in actual
interaction as distinct from in a photograph or a video frame.
AU definitions say nothing about how the face moves into and
out of an expression.
FACS can be used in a more dynamic manner. The decom-
posed appraisal process of [58] discussed above associates AU
changes with its various stages. This has been implemented in
some embodied social agents: [35] applied Sherer’s theoretical
framework in a game environment. It used only the labelled
emotions Joy, Sadness, Guilt, Anger alongside intermediate
appraisal step changes, but there is no evaluation detailed.
[70] used Hot Anger and Fear, but found many questions
about dynamics unanswered by the theory. [13] investigated
user perceptions of different smiles. It found these were
impacted by issues such as amplitude, duration, onset and
offset velocities and not just the AU. Recent work in robot
expression recognition by the authors also concluded that the
dynamics were very important in recognition [71].
A final point is that even humanoid social agents usually
lack equivalents the full set of Action Units, with faces much
less expressive than a human’s; even more true for robots.
Subtle affective behaviours van still be produced if alternatives
are sought - which may draw on film animation as well as
psychological theory.
Dimensional systems offer a numerical representation of
emotion in a space defined by two or more dimensional axes
but do not directly provide expressive behaviour. Indeed, emo-
tions can be represented as locations in a numerical Pleasure-
Arousal-Dominance space (the PAD system), symbolic labels
attached to locations, and then used to drive AUs. A more
consistent approach to facial expressions in architectures using
PAD would involve driving facial features (or AUs) directly
from the dimensional values. Here it is not necessary to trans-
late to a symbolic affective label and then back to numerically-
driven motor action.
An example of work taking this approach, though using
Pleasure (Valence) and Arousal only, and not Dominance, is
that by Lim & Aylett [38]. This applied the drive-based PSI
architecture [37] in the context of a story-telling guide, and
directly linked the output valence and arousal values to a
simple 2D graphical face with limited expressive features. In
the absence of a single psychological theory linking valence
and arousal to specific facial features, this work adopted a
number of heuristics found in the literature affecting eyes,
brows and mouth, thus bypassing linguistic labels for emotion.
Figure 3 shows part of the resulting facial feature space for
valence against high arousal (in this system high arousal was 0
and low was 1). The advantage of driving expressive behaviour
like this within a process based architecture, is that behaviour
will be naturally dynamic, and the issues of merging different
expressive modalities are dealt with separately for each feature.
The disadvantage is that it lacks the experimentally-validated
status of FACS.
If the somatic representation in use is not a symbolic
one, using PAD space to transform numerical triplets (P,
A, D) into a symbolic representation of affect allows the
somatic representation to be manipulated much more easily in
cognitive-level processing. This is useful since we will see that
social interaction theories are easier to represent symbolically.
A reactive system using drives can produce a rapid affective
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Fig. 3. Facial expressions driven directly by valence and arousal
output, using PAD space, feeding directly into motor action,
at the same time as outputting the nearest symbolic label in
the space to cognitive processing. Though this is not how
our illustrative architecture below works, we point out in our
conclusions that there may be very good reasons for taking
this approach.
IV. BASE ARCHITECTURE
Including a mind-body-mind loop for expressive behaviour
is independent of the detail of the architecture used. Any
architecture that represents mind and body components and a
structural inter-connection between them could take up these
ideas with different implementational details.
However the approach requires an architecture modelling
social interaction so that feelings returned to for re-evaluation
can be assessed in the social context. It also requires a ToM
mechanism able to assess expressed feelings for their impact
on the interaction partner. There are few existing architectures
to choose from. Building a new architecture from scratch is
certainly possible, but in this paper the aim is to explain clearly
how to deal with expressive facial behaviour as a social signal,
so using an existing architecture reduces the size of the task.
For this reason, we start from the FatiMA architecture al-
ready mentioned [28] a cognitive appraisal architecture which
has already been extended with social interaction functionali-
ties [72], in particular the Social Importance Model of Kemper
[73] - see Figure 4 and a simulation-based Theory of Mind
capability [29]. FAtiMA deals with events along two time-
scales: a reactive timescale without any intermediate process-
ing, and a deliberative timescale that allows for planning or
other cognitive processing before selecting an action. These
can be seen in Figure 4 to the right top and right bottom.
The model also includes a Memory component in which KB
is a knowledge-base of the surrounding world and its objects,
and AM is an affective memory of past interactions supporting
mood modifications. The motivational state contains goals, and
activated goals/current intentions.
The reactive system is required for immediate expressive
behaviour unrelated to planning expressions of intense distress
such as crying, or of involuntary laughing. Architectures
that only implement affective transparency could deal with
the whole of expressive behaviour like this. However, an
advantage of using FAtiMA to discuss social signals is that
it also generates affective responses via its Deliberative Layer
supporting planned or other cognitively processed expressive
behaviour as well.
Neither layer in the existing architecture entirely captures
the issue under discussion of modifying expressive behaviour.
We argue that modification can both act as a Deliberative
Layer activity and as a reaction to the agents internal feeling
of its affective state.
A. Social Importance Model
The Social Importance Model [72] is an example of inte-
grating social rules into a cognitive appraisal model. Kemper
[73] focuses specifically on power and status, both of which
are contribute to the modification of expressive behaviour for
three of the categories categories cited by Ekman [9] culture,
vocational, and needs of the moment. We here summarise the
implementation and refer the reader to [72] for further detail.
In the implementated system of 4, Social Importance (SI)
represents an aggregated generalisation on the intuitive mean-
ing of status, since the SI an agent is willing to ascribe to
another may be influenced by inter-personal liking, group
membership, adherence to social norms, expertise, and per-
sonal attributes such as wealth or strength. SI is not seen as
a static quantity but can be increased or decreased during the
course of social interactions.
The model contains three types of rules in its Reactive
Cultural Appraisal function: SI Attributions, SI Conferrals
and SI Claims. An Attribution occurs when an agent meets
another agent and uses social rules to decide how much SI it
should have. Conferrals are associated with agent goals and
result in actions that acknowledge through behaviour the SI
attribution an agent has given another. Expressive behaviour
is one example of a conferral mechanism: as in the example
of looking pleased at a birthday gift even if the agent does
not like it. Conversely, an SI Claim is behaviour carried out
by the agent to assert its own SI in the eyes of another
agent, determinable using the Theory of Mind (ToM) system
discussed in the next section.
This architecture also includes a component for dealing with
items that are socially symbolic rather than merely functional.
Examples include wearing specific clothing like evening dress,
or presenting a bouquet of flowers to a soloist at the end of
a concert. Such items impact both on the agents motivations
and its model of the motivations of others. This creates extra
inputs into Goal Selection in the Deliberative layer. Finally the
architecture can store specific plans relating to social rituals.
These are defined as action sequences with a specific social
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Fig. 4. FAtiMA with Kemper modelling
meaning that must be executed with a fixed order and content
- for example greeting someone, whether by shaking hands,
bowing or kissing cheeks.
Relative SI has an obvious role in the modification of
expressive behaviour. If another agent has a very high level
of SI, then an agent is likely to suppress negative expressive
behaviour such as anger or distress. If two agents have
equivalent levels of SI as in two close friends then much
less modification of expressive behaviour is required.
Note that this SI model has its own input into expressive
behaviour as with other aspects of an agents internal pro-
cesses. Social signals of disapproval or embarrassment could
be invoked by another claiming more SI than an agent has
attributed to them, while approval could be invoked by another
attributing the SI an agent has attributed to itself. In these cases
the agent generates a negative or positive affective state but the
extent to which this is expressed will depend on the relative
SIs involved
B. Theory of Mind
[10] defined Theory of Mind (ToM) as the ability to infer
the full range of epistemic mental states of others, i.e. beliefs,
desires, intentions and knowledge. The abstractions we make
about the states of mind of others and consequently of our own,
is a mechanism that helps to make sense of their behaviour
in specific contexts and predict their next action. A single-
level theory of mind allows us to represent an embodied
agents beliefs about another embodied agents beliefs and is
the minimum needed to consider the impact of one’s own
expressive behaviour on someone else. Most adults have at
least a two-level ToM allowing them to think about beliefs
about another’s beliefs about another’s belief’s - who might
well be you.
There are two conceptually different approaches to the
human theory of mind: the Theory-Theory approach (TT) and
the Simulation-Theory approach (ST). According to TT, the
mental state we attribute to others is not observable, but is
knowable through intuition and insight. In implementation, this
is achieved by using inference rules to reason about the beliefs
of others over an explicit model of the other.
On the other hand, ST claims that every person simulates
being another while trying to reason about their epistemic
state. This means that one can use the same structures and
processes used to update ones own beliefs and knowledge to
simulate those of others. In implementation, this involves re-
running the agent architecture as if for a different agent, and
this is conceptually straightforward for a cognitive appraisal
architecture such as FAtiMA [29].
Let us assume that Agent1 (A1) is the agent carrying out
the ToM evaluation and Agent2 (A2) is the target of this ToM.
Then in general for an action X1 of A1 :
1) set X1 to be the event E1 for appraisal
2) Run a copy of A1 on E1
3) Take X2 output by this new appraisal as the action of
A2
This recursive use of the agent architecture to simulate ToM
is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Simulation of ToM through recursion
In this form A1 assumes A2 is exactly the same as them-
selves. However if one also applies the Social Importance
model just discussed with A1 and A2 interchanged, then
effectively the ToM is modified to take into account the
difference in the social relationship from the point of view
of A2.
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This work was implemented [74]as part of a group-based
deception game, Werewolves, in which one agent is secretly
a were-wolf, able to kill other players in a segment where
everyone has their eyes closed. After the event, agents take
it in turns to accuse each other, and it is clear that the agent
playing the werewolf not only has to lie about their status but
accompany it with convincing expressive behaviour if it is to
play well.
V. UPDATED ARCHITECTURE
A number of updates to this architecture are needed in order
to add the capability of modifiable expressive behaviour. Here
initial conceptual work has been carried out under the banner
of the Partial Poker Face [75] capturing the idea that expressive
behaviour modification in humans is rarely perfect. Figure 6
shows the changes that would have to be made to the FAtiMA
architecture.
This is a slightly simplified version of 4 with some addi-
tions: Intrinsic Events, Virtual Body and Expressive Behaviour
components, Partial Poker Face (PPF) and Expressive Be-
haviour (EB) Social Rules, Re-evaluation and ToM. Actions
are planned sequences from the Deliberative Layer, Partial
Poker Face and EB Social Rules are in fact part of the Reactive
Layer, extracted here to make the diagram clearer.
In order to motivate these changes, we work through a
scenario from [72] used to discuss the SI model of section
4a. In this scenario, a traveller enters a bar after failing to find
the way to their hotel. At the start of the scene, there are only
two characters sitting in the bar and they are talking to each
other. The barman is absent (although he later appears). The
goal of the traveller is to find directions to their hotel. In the
version discussed in [72], the traveller is an avatar directed by
a human user, and the discussion focused on the behaviour of
the two agents in the bar. We adapt it to investigate how the
expressive behavior of a social agent version of the traveller
would be generated in the proposed architecture.
A. Intrinsic and extrinsic events
The first change that is needed to construct the mind-body-
mind circuit at issue is a distinction between events external
to the agent entering into cognitive appraisal (extrinsic) and
events within the agent (intrinsic) generated by its affective
responses. This distinction was not made in the ToM discus-
sion above because the original motivation for that work was
allowing an agent to evaluate the impact on others of its ex-
ternal actions upon the world. Expressive behaviour resulting
from affective responses in agents exhibiting transparency had
so far been considered to be hard-wired. As social signals they
can be thought of as responses to intrinsic events. Note that
intrinsic events may not be entirely invisible to other agents
where they are associated with truly involuntary behaviour at
the physiological level, such as blushing or sweating.
In the scenario, the traveller asks the bar agents if they can
give directions to the traveller’s hotel. In the discussion of [72],
if these agents come from a collectivist culture, they will be
offended by the request since the traveller is not in their in-
group, and they will scowl and tell the traveller to wait for the
bar man to arrive.
In our simulation, the traveller agent will then appraise the
rejection of their request as a goal failure, and within the
reactive layer interpret the scowls as disapproval. This will
generate a negative emotion of anger which is dispatched to
the Virtual Body. This corresponds to the somatic component
of 2. The associated expressive behaviour is sent out to the
expressive system but the feeling of anger from the Virtual
Body is passed back to the Intrinsic Event (IE) component,
tagged with the Extrinsic Event (EE) ID and time-stamp
that originated it. This raises an intrinsic event, with an ID
and time-stamp, making the agent aware of its emotion, thus
beginning the mind-body-mind loop.
B. Re-evaluation and Partial Poker Face
Conceptually, modifiable expressive behaviour must operate
on a rapid reactive level as well as on a slower deliberative
level. Otherwise modification would occur quite late and
the underlying emotion would result in clearly identifiable
expressive behaviour. The speed of this reactive layer is a
variable in the personal presentation of an embodied agent
- some agents might suppress initial facial expressions much
faster than others, just as the intensity of the initial emotion
might vary between individual agents too and be therefore
harder or easier to suppress.
Thus the event signalling the traveller’s anger is fed back
through the re-evaluation module to the PPF component which
is a set of reactive rules about dealing with emotions. These
rules draw on the agent’s knowledge of social expressive
behaviour which are flattened versions of ToM reasoning -
that is to say compile the output of ToM reasoning into simple
rules. In this case, PPF draws on a social rule that says if an
agent expresses anger to someone it causes an angry response
with high undesirability. Because this is a reactive rule it deals
with a generic social situation, where the ToM module would
reason about the concrete circumstances.
This rule leads PPF to genrate a neutral expression action
to suppress the angry expressive behaviour already dispatched.
The PPF sends this to the Action module where it returns to
the Virtual Body and is dispatched as expressive behaviour.
When it returns to Instrinsic Event but its IE tag shows that
it has been dealt with, preventing an infinite loop.
C. Deliberative level
The IE component has also passed the emotion to the ToM
module which is able to reason about the actual impact of
an angry expression on the current goal of the traveller. ToM
runs a copy of the appraisal system to assess the impact of
the traveller’s angry emotion on the bar agents, taking the SI
of the traveller and the bar agents into account.
The ToM system will assess the angry expression as reduc-
ing the liking of the the bar agents for the traveller, reducing
its SI and increasing the threat to its goal of finding the hotel.
This information is passed back to the deliberative system
whose planner assesses the ask-the-barman subgoal as a way
of achieving the find-hotel goal and deals with the SI threat by
proposing a smile and agreement with the proposal of the bar
agents. These actions are dispatched to the virtual body but
1949-3045 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TAFFC.2019.2906200, IEEE
Transactions on Affective Computing
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 10
Fig. 6. FAtiMA modified to allow modified expressive behaviour
as the smile represents a social signal rather than an affective
change it is not passed back round the mind-body-mind loop
by the Expressive Behaviour Component but only dispatched
for execution.
The net effect on the traveller agent’s behaviour is thus
an angry micro-expression, suppressed quickly by a neutral
expression and then replaced by a social smile.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have tried to reformulate the architecture
of an embodied social agent to support the capability of
expressive behaviour as a social signal rather than only as an
indicator of the agent’s internal state. The first question one
should ask is of course whether this is worth doing. There
are after all valid arguments for using an embodied agents
expressive behaviour to reveal internal state, especially in the
case of robots, which are heavy pieces of metallic machinery
that should share a human social space in a way that is
comfortable for humans. Knowing how a robot is responding
and what it is about to do are useful aspects of human-robot
interaction. Indeed there is work [76] suggesting that action-
expression revealing the motivation and context for an agent
action through expressive behaviour is a necessity for smooth
interaction.
As with so many questions in research, whether this is worth
doing is a case of it depends. Primarily it depends on the social
context in which the embodied agent is expected to perform.
We have already seen above that there are applications for
which modified expressive behaviour is not only interesting
but essential. This seems particularly true for those in which
an embodied social agent is following a vocational role, such
as tutor, trainer, guide, receptionist. It would be even more true
if the application domain related to drama and not to more
naturalistic interaction, not only in entertainment applications
but also in areas such as role-play based education and
training. Here the activity itself is limited by the complexity
and expense of supplying human actors, and there is clear
scope for the use of social agents.
The approach discussed also supports in a principled way
expressive behaviour which is difficult to generate - as against
hardcode - without it. One group of such behaviours involves
a combination of physiological signals with more cognitively-
generated behaviour. Embarrassment, signalled by blushing
(a physiological reaction) plus glancing away, would be an
example of this. The blush can be generated very rapidly by
the intrinsic event raised by the simulated body, while the
glance-away is generated later by consciously ’feeling’ the
emotion as it progresses further through the mind-body-mind
loop. A second group of behaviours relate to the overlay of one
expression by another as a socially determined expression fails
to completely override an internally generated emotion. This
supports the known issues with smiles, which often combine
with elements of other facial expressions, such as the disgust
hardcoded in by [40]. This is achieved by a slow decay on
a high-intensity emotion dispatched from the simulated body
and an overlaid smile from the cognitive stage of the mind-
body-mind loop.
Much of the discussion above - very much in line with
the literature - has taken a naturalistic approach, using normal
human social behaviour as a yardstick. However this assump-
tion should on occasion be challenged. It is not a foregone
conclusion that this is the way to incorporate an embodied
social agent into everyday human environments. These are
agents, they do not and will not for the foreseeable future have
human-level abilities given the extreme difficulties involved. It
could be that drama rather than naturalism is the more useful
paradigm. Indeed the idea of action-expression [76] is more
closely related to drama than to naturalism. By showing a
sequence of expressions as expressive behaviour is modified,
one supplies the human interaction partner with information
about the social adjustment of the agent, much in the style
of drama, where double-takes and slow realisations are very
much standard tropes.
A further argument in favour of a machinery for modifying
expressive behaviour is its use in decoding the expressive
behaviour of human interaction partners. The problems as-
sociated with facial expression recognition have not been the
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subject of this discussion, but one of the most significant is
moving from sensor-based detection of facial movements to
an identification of the social signal being deployed. An agent
that has no concept of facial expressions as social signals, and
works on the basis that there will be a one-to-one mapping
between the expression and the users affective state is unlikely
to be successful. As argued at the start of this paper, one
can recognise a smile, but the signal the smile represents
is a different matter. An agent that has a simulation ToM
implementation can at least run its own architecture as a
decoding mechanism in the current social context.
A. Limitations
The most obvious limitation in the discussion of this paper
is that it is conceptual and has not yet been implemented.
However, though much of the necessary basis for an im-
plementation already exists in the FAtiMA architecture, the
main point being made here is that research into embodied
social agents should move from a widespread view of agent
expressive behaviour as transparently affective especially in
the case of facial expressions - and move to the social signal
paradigm. We would argue that this also means a move away
from the individualistic assumptions underlying many agent
architectures into a more socially located account.
A limitation of the suggested changes above in the FA-
tiMA architecture is that this version of the architecture is
entirely symbolic in representation, making truly dynamic
expressive behaviour problematic. In order to implement the
dynamic PAD-space control of expressive behaviour discussed
in section III one would have to choose the FAtiMA variant
FAtiMA-PSI [[77] system discussed above in section 2B. Here
the FAtiMA symbolically-encoded reactive system is replaced
by the PSI [37] five drives: Energy, Integrity, Affiliation,
Certainty and Competence and a homeostatic mechanism that
chooses actions and goals according to which drives need to
be returned to their comfort-zone.
As an example of a non-symbolic approach that has no
explicit representation of affect, it is easy to see how it can
drive expressive behaviour dynamically. It is less easy to see
how one could incorporate the reactive elements of the Social
Importance Model. While we argue that most of the discussion
is relatively independent of the actual implementation architec-
ture, it is clear that this difficulty would apply to other non-
symbolic architectures, such as those generated by machine
learning approaches.
The recent ALEXA challenge [78], involving a disembodied
(voice-only) conversational agent indicates the most likely
solution. The systems that did best in an unrestricted con-
versational context were compound ones in which machine-
learning derived transition networks sat underneath symbolic
rule-based systems that provided context and a degree of sanity
check. It seems plausible that a compound of this type could
supply fast dynamic facial expressions from its sub-symbolic
processing, use PAD space to translate these into symbolic
representations that are then passed into symbolic SI rules,
and pass the outcome back through PAD space into the non-
symbolic system.
In conclusion, these are the generic requirements for ex-
pressive behaviour as social signals outlined here.
1) A mind-body-mind loop that allows an agent to feel its
affect and can trigger..
2) ..intrinsic events differentiated from extrinsic events
coming from the surrounding environment.
3) A re-evaluation process that responds to intrinsic events
and modifies expressive behaviour
4) A model of social interaction that can be used by the re-
evaluation system to translate from desired social signal
to modified expressive behaviour
5) A ToM that can assess the social impact of an agents ex-
pressive behaviour and support a deliberative processing
level in modification.
We hope that this paper will help to stimulate work in
improving expressive behaviour and changing the default
approach to one of social signal generation.
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